Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law by Garrity, Vincent F., Jr. & Morton, Mark A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
4-1-1997
Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in
Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of Lock-Up
Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law
Vincent F. Garrity Jr.
Mark A. Morton
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Corporation and Enterprise Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vincent F. Garrity Jr. and Mark A. Morton, Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of Lock-
Up Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 677 (1997)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol51/iss3/7
Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed
in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of
Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware
and Pennsylvania Law
VINCENT F. GARRITY, JR. AND MARK A. MORTON*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 677
II. THE PROPOSED CONRAILJCSX MERGER .................................. 679
A. The Norfolk Offer ................................................ 680
B. CSX Responds to the Norfolk Offer ................................. 681
C. The First Preliminary Injunction Hearing ............................ 682
D. CSX Closes First-Step Tender Offer and Commences Second-Step Tender
Offer, Conrail Schedules Stockholder Vote on Charter Amendment ...... 686
E. The Second Preliminary Injunction Hearing .......................... 687
F. CSX Increases Offer by Adding Convertible Preferred Stock ............ 687
G. Norfolk Raises Its Cash Offer to $115 per Share ..................... 688
H. The Third Preliminary Injunction Hearing ........................... 688
III. DELAWARE LAW ..................................................... 689
A. Standards of Review .............................................. 691
B. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-Ups Under the Unocal Standard ....... 694
C. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-Ups Under the Entire Fairness
Standard ........................ .............................. 695
D. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-Ups Under the Revlon Standard ........ 696
IV. AN APPLICATION OF DELAWARE LAW TO THE CONRAIUCSX MERGER ........ 703
A. Analyzing the ConrailICSX Lock-Ups Under the Unocal Standard ........ 703
B. Analyzing the Conrail/CSX Lock-Ups Under the Entire Fairness Standard
707
C. Analyzing the Conrail/CSX Lock-ups Under the Revlon Standard ........ 707
V . CONCLUSION . ........................................................ 710
V I. EPILOGUE ........................................................... 711
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 1996, CSX Corporation ("CSX"), owner of the
third largest railroad in the United States, announced that it had agreed
to acquire Conrail Inc. ("Conrail"), owner of the nation's fifth largest
* Mr. Garrity is a member of the bar of Pennsylvania and a partner in the Philadelphia
office of Duane, Morris & Heckscher. Mr. Morton is a member of the bars of both Delaware and
Pennsylvania and a senior associate with the Wilmington, Delaware office of Duane, Morris &
Heckscher. The authors gratefully acknowledge the efforts of Robert J. Valihura, a senior
associate with the Wilmington, Delaware office of Duane, Morris & Heckscher, in preparing the
Delaware law section of this Article.
The authors drafted and submitted this Article during the pendency of the bidding war by
CSX and Norfolk for Conrail. As a result, the Article only addresses factual and legal
developments through early January of 1997. The authors have attached an epilogue in order to
address events occurring after that time in the battle for control of Conrail.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
railroad, for cash and securities valued at slightly over $8 billion.'
Within days, rival Norfolk Southern Corporation ("Norfolk"), owner of
the remaining major railroad in the eastern United States, weighed in
with an all cash hostile bid of approximately $9.1 billion for Conrail.2
However, while Norfolk's original bid and each of its subsequent bids
have offered a greater value than the cash and stock proposals of CSX,
so far Norfolk's efforts to acquire Conrail have been stymied by, inter
alia, certain defensive provisions in the Agreement and Plan of Merger
by and among Conrail, Green Acquisition Corp., a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of CSX ("Green"), and CSX dated as of October 14, 1996 (the
"Merger Agreement"). 3 Indeed, Conrail has utilized these defensive
provisions, commonly known as "lock-ups,"4 as its principal defense in
its efforts to fend off Norfolk's hostile advances and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania so far has
deferred to the Conrail board's business judgment in agreeing to include
"lock-up" provisions in the Merger Agreement and accordingly the court
has declined to invalidate the "lock-ups" under Pennsylvania law.
However, the deference paid by the district court to the Conrail
board's decision to adopt and maintain in place various "lock-up" provi-
sions has prompted some to consider whether the Delaware courts would
have reached the same conclusion concerning the adoption and use of
the "lock-up" provisions if litigation had been filed in the Delaware
Court of Chancery and Conrail had been a Delaware, rather than a Penn-
sylvania, corporation. In the discussion that follows, the authors
examine this question and conclude that it is likely that the Delaware
courts, unlike the district court, would have invalidated some or all of
the "lock-up" provisions employed by Conrail and CSX.5
1. Steven Lipin & Daniel Machalaba, CSX Agrees to Acquire Conrail for $8.1 Billion in
Cash and Stock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1996, at A3.
2. Steven Lipin et al., Norfolk Southern Bids $9.1 Billion for Conrail, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24,
1996, at A3.
3. The parties to the Merger Agreement agreed to amend the Agreement on November 5,
1996 (the "First Amendment") and December 18, 1996 (the "Second Amendment").
4. Although some commentators define the term "lock-up" narrowly, see, e.g., DENNIS J.
BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 404 (4th ed. 1995), the Delaware courts treat the
term more expansively and, as a general matter, have considered stock options, termination fees,
and no-shop provisions to be types of "lock-up" devices. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. Nos.
9536 & 9561, 1988 WL 8772, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988). For purposes of this Article, the
authors have employed a similarly expansive definition of "lock-ups" and have treated each of the
devices employed in the Merger Agreement as a "lock-up" device.
5. For purposes of this Article, the authors have not attempted to survey Pennsylvania court
decisions concerning lock-ups. Rather, the authors have examined only the district court's
decisions which have been rendered in connection with the proposed Conrail/CSX merger. The
authors have, however, surveyed each decision of the Delaware courts that has addressed similar
lock-up provisions under Delaware law.
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II. THE PROPOSED CONRAILICSX MERGER
On October 15, 1996, Conrail and CSX announced that Conrail had
agreed to be acquired by CSX through a multi-tiered structure which
included a front-end loaded cash tender offer (in two stages) followed by
a back-end merger (the "CSX Proposal"). 6  Pursuant to the Merger
Agreement, CSX agreed to make an initial cash tender offer for up to
19.9% of Conrail stock at a price of $92.50 per share (the "First CSX
Offer").7 Thereafter, Conrail would call and hold a special stockholders'
meeting at which the stockholders would vote on a proposed amendment
to the Articles of Incorporation of Conrail (the "Charter Amendment")
whereby Conrail would opt out of, i.e., render inapplicable, Subchapter
25E of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law (the "PBCL"). 9
Provided the Conrail stockholders shall have approved the Charter
Amendment, CSX further agreed to follow its first step cash tender offer
with a second step cash tender for up to 20.1% of Conrail's shares at
$92.50 per share.' Finally, Conrail has agreed to call another special
stockholders' meeting at which the Conrail stockholders would be asked
to approve a merger of Conrail with and into Green, the wholly-owned
acquisition subsidiary of CSX, pursuant to which the holder of each
Conrail share would receive either a combination of CSX stock and cash
(if the Charter Amendment was approved) or a number of shares of CSX
stock based upon the price of CSX stock on the date the merger was
announced."
Significantly, the Merger Agreement incorporated a number of
6. See Press Release from Conrail (Oct. 15, 1996) (hereinafter Oct. 15 Conrail Press
Release); see also Offer to Purchase for Cash an Aggregate of 17,860,124 Shares of Common
Stock and Series A ESOP Convertible Junior Preferred Stock of Conrail Inc. by Green Acquisition
Corp. (Oct. 16, 1996) (hereinafter Oct. 16 Green Offer); Fourth Amended Complaint 15, Norfolk
Southern Corp. (C.A. No. 96-CV-7167) (hereinafter Complaint).
7. See Oct. 15 Conrail Press Release, supra note 6; Oct. 16 Green Offer, supra note 6.
Based upon Conrail's closing price of $71.00 per share on the day before the announcement of the
proposed merger, Conrail's shareholders stood to receive a significant premium for their shares.
8. See Oct. 15 Conrail Press Release, supra note 6; Oct. 16 Green Offer, supra note 6.
9. Section 25E requires any person acquiring control of 20% or more of a Pennsylvania
"registered" corporation, as defined therein, to acquire, upon demand, all other shares of the
corporation for a "fair price" in cash. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2541-2548 (West 1996).
Because the scope of this Article is limited to an examination of the lock-ups agreed to by
Conrail's board, the authors have not attempted to address the ramifications or general
applicability of Chapter 25 of the PBCL or its other takeover provisions.
10. See Oct. 15 Conrail Press Release, supra note 6; Oct. 16 Green Offer, supra note 6.
11. See Agreement and Plan of Merger art. II (Oct. 14, 1996) (hereinafter Merger
Agreement). The Merger Agreement also provided that the board of directors of the surviving
corporation would be divided equally between directors selected by Conrail and directors selected
by CSX and that the corporate headquarters of the surviving entity would be located in
Philadelphia, with Mr. Levan as the immediate President and COO, his selection as CEO in two
years and his selection as Chairman in four years.
1997]
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"lock-up" provisions. First, Section 5.9(b) of the Merger provided for
the payment of a "break-up" or termination fee' 2 of $300 million, which
represented at the time more than 3% of the transaction price. Second,
concurrent with the Merger Agreement, Conrail and CSX entered into
an option agreement pursuant to which Conrail granted CSX a stock
option' 3 to acquire for $92.50 in cash per share approximately 10% of
Conrail's shares. Notably, in this case, there was no "cap" or upper limit
in place on the economic benefit that CSX would realize from exercising
this option. Third, Section 4.2 of the Merger Agreement included a
form of no-shop, which provided, subject to certain exceptions, that
Conrail's directors may not (i) solicit, or participate in negotiations con-
cerning, another proposal, 4 (ii) approve or recommend another propo-
sal, or (iii) withdraw or modify their recommendation of the CSX
Proposal for a period of 180 days (i.e., until April 15, 1997). 5 Finally,
in addition to agreeing to amend its poison pill' 6 to exempt the CSX
Proposal, Conrail agreed, pursuant to Sections 3.1 and 5.14 of the
Merger Agreement, that it would not (i) further amend its poison pill
without the prior consent of CSX, or (ii) take any action with respect to
its poison pill plan to facilitate any offer (other than the CSX Proposal)
to acquire Conrail.' 7
A. The Norfolk Offer
In response to the CSX Proposal, Norfolk announced on October
12. A "break-up" or termination fee requires a target corporation to pay a fixed sum to the
proposed merger partner in the event that the merger transaction is not consummated. See BLOCK,
supra note 4, at 440-41. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have upheld reasonable break-up
fees. See id. at 441.
13. In merger transactions, the target corporation frequently grants a friendly acquiror an
option to purchase a block of the target's stock, which the acquiror usually may exercise only after
it acquires a predetermined ownership position in the target. See id. at 404. In circumstances
where the stock option provides the acquiror with a foothold, but not the right to seize control, the
courts typically have upheld the options. See id.
14. Conrail was entitled to provide information to and to negotiate with an unsolicited
competing bidder only until the earliest of (i) the completion of the First CSX Offer, (ii) the
approval of the CSX Proposal by the Conrail stockholders, or (iii) December 31, 1998. See
Merger Agreement, supra note 11, § 4.2.
15. No shop provisions "are promises by a corporation to deal exclusively with the white
knight, and not to solicit or provide information to a third party, and, in the absence of a fiduciary
out, not to accept a later, better offer." BLOCK, supra note 4, at 426-27.
16. Typically, the "poison pill," or shareholders rights plan adopted by a board of directors,
provides for the issuance of an uncertificated right to each stockholder of the company. See id. at
520-21. In the event of certain triggering events, including the accumulation of a certain amount
of the company's stock by a third party without the board's consent, the holder of such
uncertificated right becomes entitled to purchase one or more shares of the company's common
stock at a substantially discounted price, resulting in a lethal economic detriment to the third party
who is not eligible to receive the rights. See id. at 521-22.
17. See Complaint, supra note 6, 5.
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23, 1996 its intention to commence, through a wholly-owned subsidiary,
a cash tender offer for any and all shares of Conrail stock for $100 per
share (the "Norfolk Offer") or $9.1 billion, which offer would be fol-
lowed by a cash merger at the same price (collectively, the "Norfolk
Proposal").' 8 In addition, since the Norfolk Offer also provides that a
voting trust will be created to hold the Conrail stock acquired by Norfolk
either pursuant to its offer or subsequent merger, the Conrail stockhold-
ers would receive immediate payment for their shares in connection with
each step of the Norfolk Proposal, unlike the CSX Proposal in which
payment of the "back-end" consideration would be deferred until regula-
tory approval of the merger was obtained.' 9 Finally, in a letter delivered
to the board of directors of Conrail on the same date, Norfolk expressed
its interest in negotiating a friendly merger with Conrail and stated that
all aspects of the Norfolk Proposal remained flexible.2" In particular, the
letter noted that Norfolk would consider adding a substantial equity
component to its proposal, if so desired, so that the Conrail stockholders
would retain a continuing equity interest in the surviving company. 2'
The Norfolk Proposal was conditioned upon, among other things,
(i) Norfolk having obtained sufficient financing for the Norfolk Propo-
sal, (ii) the valid tender of a majority of the shares of Conrail's stock,
(iii) the inapplicability of Subchapter 25F (a "Business Combination"
anti-takeover provision) of the PBCL to the Norfolk Offer, (iv) receipt
of an informal written opinion of the Surface Transportation Board
("STB") confirming that the use of a voting trust is consistent with the
policies of the STB, (v) the termination of the Merger Agreement, and
(vi) Conrail's poison pill either having been redeemed or amended so as
to exempt the Norfolk Proposal.22
B. CSX Responds to the Norfolk Offer
On November 6, 1996, Conrail and CSX announced that they had
amended the original Merger Agreement in several key respects (the
"First Amendment"). 23  First, CSX agreed to increase the cash portion
18. See id. 15. Based upon the closing $71.00 market price of Conrail's stock on the day
before the CSX Proposal, the Norfolk Proposal represented a 40% premium. See id.
19. See Norfolk Southern Plans All Cash $100 per Share Offer for Conrail, Bus. Wire, Oct.
23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
20. See Complaint, supra note 6, 16.
21. See id.
22. See Offer to Purchase for Cash Shares of Common Stock and Series A ESOP Convertible
Junior Preferred Stock of Conrail, Inc. by Atlantic Acquisition Corporation, a Wholly-Owned
Subsidiary of Norfolk Southern Corporation (Oct. 24, 1996); see also Norfolk Southern Plans All
Cash $100 per Share Offer for Conrail, supra note 19.
23. See Supplement dated Nov. 6, 1996, to the Offer to Purchase of CSX Corporation dated
Oct. 16, 1996.
19971
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(at both stages) of its proposed transaction to $110 per share of Conrail
stock (the "Second CSX Offer").2 4 The Second CSX Offer did not,
however, change the back-end consideration originally offered by
CSX.25 Second, the First Amendment included an amendment to Sec-
tion 4.2(a) of the Merger Agreement to extend to nine months the period
of time during which the Conrail Board cannot withdraw its support of
the Merger Agreement or agree to any competing transactions.26 As a
result of the adoption of the First Amendment on November 5, 1996, the
"lock-out" provisions imposed by section 4.2(a) (the "Lock-Out") on the
Conrail Board were to run through July 12, 1997.27 Third, the First
Amendment also provided for a new section 4.3, which had been
requested by Conrail, that prohibited both Conrail and CSX from engag-
ing in discussions or entering into any agreement with any railroad com-
pany, including Norfolk, relating to trackage rights or other concessions
without the consent of the other party.28 Finally, CSX announced that
the expiration date for the CSX Proposal would be extended from mid-
night on November 15 to midnight on November 20, 1996.29 Due to the
First Amendment, Conrail also announced the cancellation of the
November 14th special meeting of stockholders of Conrail and that the
rescheduled meeting was likely to be held in mid-December.3" On
November 7th, one day after the announcement of the Second CSX
Offer, Norfolk responded and increased its offer for all shares of Con-
rail's stock to $110 per share. 31
C. The First Preliminary Injunction Hearing
On November 18 and 19, 1996, the district court held a hearing on
Norfolk's motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin CSX from clos-
ing its first stage cash tender offer for up to 19.9% of the shares of
Conrail's stock. At the hearing, Norfolk contended, inter alia, that the
Conrail directors had breached their fiduciary duties when they agreed to
the CSX Proposal and that the Conrail stockholders were being illegally
24. See id.
25. See id. According to Norfolk, the value of the back-end consideration, based upon the
closing sales price of CSX stock on November 7, 1996, was only $82.14 per share of Conrail
stock and therefore the blended value of the improved CSX Proposal was approximately $93 per
share. See Complaint, supra note 6, 50.
26. See Complaint, supra note 6, 50.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. Subsequently, Conrail announced that the special meeting of its stockholders,
which originally was to be held on November 14, 1996, would be rescheduled for December 23,
1996. See id. 51; Complaint, supra note 6, 51.
31. See Supplement dated Nov. 8, 1996 to the Offer to Purchase of Norfolk Southern
Corporation dated Oct. 24, 1996.
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coerced by the terms of the CSX Proposal to tender their shares to
CSX.32 In an oral ruling delivered at the conclusion of the hearing on
November 19, 1996, the district court denied the motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction after concluding that (i) the members of the Conrail
board of directors had not violated their fiduciary duties, and (ii) the
CSX Proposal was not coercive. 33
Before addressing Norfolk's allegation that the Conrail board mem-
bers had breached their fiduciary duties, the district court first sought to
determine what the board's fiduciary duties entailed and to whom those
duties were owed. According to the court, section 1712 of the PBCL
sets forth the general duties of directors and imposes a fiduciary obliga-
tion on each director to perform his or her duties in good faith and in a
manner such director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation. 34 This duty, the court noted, "is to the corporation; not
necessarily to the shareholders. '35
The fiduciary duties of the board of directors are "further spelled
out," according to the court, by section 1715 of the PBCL, which
''expressly and perhaps uniquely provides that directors may consider all
groups that may be' affected by their actions, including shareholders,
employees, customers, [and the] communities in which the corporate
offices and facilities are located and [they] may consider both the short-
term and the long-term interests of the corporation. 36 In fact, the court
32. See Transcript of Hearing 640 (Nov. 18-19, 1996) (hereinafter November Bench Ruling).
33. See id. at 646, 652.
34. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1712(a) (West 1996). Section 1712(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that:
a director of a business corporation shall stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and shall perform his duties as a director.., in good faith, in a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with such
care, including reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances.
35. November Bench Ruling, supra note 32, at 642.
36. Id. at 642 (citing section 1715(a) of the PBCL). Section 1715(a) provides that:
(a). GENERAL RULE. In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the
board of directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a business
corporation may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider to the
extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the
corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation are located.
(2) The short-term and long-term interests of the corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the corporation from its long-term plans and the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation.
(3) The resources, intent and conduct (past, stated and potential) of any person
seeking to acquire control of the corporation.
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notes, when the board is considering the best interests of the corporation,
or the effects of its actions, the board is not required to "consider the
interests of any group, obviously including shareholders, as a dominant
or controlling factor" in its decision making process.37
Moreover, the court added, subsection 1715(c): further qualifies
directors' obligations by expressly providing that the directors's
fiduciary
duties shall not be deemed to require the [directors] ... [to] redeem
any rights under or to modify or render inapplicable any sharehold-
ers' rights plans [or to] ... render inapplicable or make determina-
tions under subchapter E relating to control transactions ...[or]
[s]ubchapter F relating to business combinations... [or] to act solely
because of the effect such action might have on an acquisition or
potential acquisition of control, or the consideration that might be
offered or paid to shareholders in such an acquisition.38
Finally, the Court noted that, pursuant to Section 1715(d) of the
PBCL, "any act relating to an acquisition to which a majority of the
(4) All other pertinent factors.
The court added that section 1716 of the PBCL "reiterates" the statement in section 1715(a) that
directors may consider the effects of its decisions on stockholders, employees, suppliers, custom-
ers and the communities in which the company operates when making a decision. Id. at 645-46.
37. Id. at 643 (citing section 1715(b) of the PBCL). Section 1715(b) provides that the board
"shall not be required, in considering the best interests of the corporation or the effect of any
action, to regard any corporate interest or the interests of any particular group affected by such
action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor" and the board's "consideration of interests
and factors in the manner described in this subsection and in [1715(a)] shall not constitute a
violation" of the standard of care set forth in section 1712 of the PBCL. Once again, in the court's
view, section 1716 reiterates the statement in section 1715(b) that "no factor [considered by the
board] need be predominant." Id. at 646.
38. Id. at 643-44 (citing section 1715 (c) of the PBCL). Section 1715(c) provides that:
(c) Specific applications. - In exercising the powers vested in the corporation,
including, without limitation, those powers pursuant to section 1502 (relating to
general powers), and in no way limiting the discretion of the board of directors,
committees of the board and individual directors pursuant to subsections (a) and (b),
the fiduciary duty of directors shall not be deemed to require them:
(1) to redeem any rights under, or to modify or render inapplicable, any
shareholder rights plans, including, but not limited to, a plan adopted pursuant or
made subject to section 2513 (relating to disparate treatment of certain persons);
(2) to render inapplicable, or make determinations under, the provisions of
Subchapter E (relating to control transactions), Subchapter F (relating to business
combinations), Subchapter G (relating to control-share acquisitions) or Subchapter
H (relating to disgorgement by certain controlling shareholders following attempts
to acquire control) of Subchapter 25 or under any other provision of this title
relating to or affecting acquisitions or potential or proposed acquisitions of control;
or
(3) to act as the board of directors, a committee of the board or an individual
director solely because of the effect such action might have on an acquisition or
potential or proposed acquisition of control of the corporation or the consideration
that might be offered or paid to shareholders in such an acquisition.
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disinterested directors shall have assented shall be presumed" to have
satisfied the directors' fiduciary duties under section 1712 unless "it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the disinterested directors
did not assent to such act in good faith after reasonable investigation."39
In this case, the court concluded the board's actions had been
approved by a majority of the disinterested directors.4" Therefore, under
section 1715(d) of the PBCL, the plaintiffs had an obligation to prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the board did not render its deci-
sions in good faith after reasonable investigation." Since the plaintiffs
failed to meet this burden, the court held that "[f]or this reason alone, the
grant of preliminary injunction may not be granted. 4 2
In addition to reaching its holding, however, the court offered the
following commentary on the plaintiffs' arguments, the policy underly-
ing the applicable provisions of the PBCL and the wisdom of certain
examples of Delaware jurisprudence:
Basically it seems to me that the plaintiffs are contending that
the sole or at least the primary consideration by a board of directors
in considering a competing offer ...should be which competitor
offers the best short-range price or profit for shareholders. Clearly
Pennsylvania statutory law is expressly against such a contention....
It seems clear that the Pennsylvania statutes to which I have
referred were enacted with the decisions of the Delaware State Courts
and particularly [Unocal] Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Corpora-
tion, and Revlon, Incorporated v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings,
Incorporated... in mind and in order to exclude those.., decisions
that seem to mandate or suggest that the primary or perhaps only
consideration in a situation where there is an attempted takeover...
is what is the best financial deal for the stockholders in the short
term.
Although those decisions may be fine for the shareholders
whose only interest is that of a short-term financial investment to
maximize their profits, it completely ignores the economic utility and
value of corporations as a form of business enterprise that produces
goods and services for the public and in the national economy, in this
case railroad services.
Directors have the right to consider these matters, and by statute
39. Id. at 644-45 (citing section 1715(d) of the PBCL). Section 1715(d) provides, in pertinent
part, that:
Absent breach of fiduciary duty, lack of good faith or self-dealing, any act as the
board of directors, a committee of the board or an individual director shall be
presumed to be in the best interest of the corporation.
40. See id. at 646.
41. See id.
42. Id.
1997]
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in Pennsylvania they have the right to consider all matter including
not only the rights of shareholders and financial interests of share-
holders, but these other so-called constituencies.43
Finally, the court criticized both the "myopic view" of the Dela-
ware courts in the Unocal and Revlon line of cases that the interests of
stockholders should be given the highest priority, as well as the practical
problem of placing business decisions in the hands of judges rather than
in the hands of sophisticated business managers."
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the CSX Proposal was
unlawfully and unfairly coercing the Conrail stockholders to tender. To
the contrary, the court held, "I do not see any coercion, but only several
options, any of which will undoubtedly end up being a net return to most
shareholders far in excess of whatever their original investment may
have been."45
In conclusion, the court held
that it is clear from the Pennsylvania statutes ... that it is up to the
board of directors and they alone ... [to determine] what is in the
best interests of the corporation. And that the directors have every
right to favor one competing bid over another and particularly have
the right to resist hostile takeovers by such methods as poison pills,
shareholders' rights, making recommendations to shareholders,
favoring one proposed corporate party over the other, and using stock
options in favor of one corporation over another, and include exten-
sive so-called break-up fees. And certainly it seems to me that it can
agree not to shop their proposal after signing a merger agreement.
46
D. CSX Closes First Step Tender Offer and Commences Second Step
Tender Offer/Conrail Schedules Stockholder Vote on
Charter Amendment
When the Second CSX Offer expired at midnight on November 20,
1996, CSX closed on its purchase of 19.9% of the Conrail stock.47 Sev-
eral days later, on November 25, 1996, CSX announced that a special
meeting of stockholders would be held on December 23, 1996 (the
"December Special Meeting"), for purposes of conducting a vote of
43. See id. at 646-48.
44. See id. at 649.
45. Id. at 652. As the court observed, the stockholders' options included, inter alia, (i) the
right to tender their shares and then vote against the merger, (ii) the right to tender their shares and
then vote for the merger, (iii) the right to hold their shares, and (iv) the right to sell their shares
into the market prior to the consummation of the CSX Proposal. See id. at 650-52.
46. Id. at 655.
47. See Complaint, supra note 6, 66. Since approximately 85% of the shares of Conrail
stock were tendered to CSX, the company was required to accept shares on a pro rata basis. See
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Conrail's stockholders on the Charter Amendment48 and, on December
6, CSX commenced its second step tender offer to purchase up to an
aggregate of 18,344,845 (or approximately 20%) of additional shares of
Conrail's stock at $110 per share (the "Second Step Offer").4 9 The CSX
Second Step Offer was conditioned, inter alia, on approval of the Char-
ter Amendment by the Conrail stockholders."
E. The Second Preliminary Injunction Hearing
In response to Conrail's statement that it did not intend to convene
the December Special Meeting unless the company had sufficient prox-
ies to win approval of the Charter Amendment, 5' Norfolk asked the
court to grant a preliminary injunction prohibiting Conrail from postpon-
ing the December Special Meeting. 2 On December 17, 1996, the court
held a hearing to consider plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.
Characterizing the manner in which the vote was to be held as "funda-
mentally unfair" and as amounting to a "sham election," the court
granted the plaintiffs' motion and enjoined Conrail from postponing,
adjourning or not convening the December Special Meeting, absent
intervening material events. 3
F. CSX Increases Offer By Adding Convertible Preferred Stock
On December 19th, only two days after the court granted plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction, Conrail and CSX announced that
48. See id. at 69. Notably, however, the terms of the Merger Agreement prohibited Conrail
from convening the December Special Meeting without CSX's consent. See id. at 70. CSX's
ability to control whether the December Special Meeting was to be held prompted substantial
criticism from the media. For example, one local newspaper chose to characterize the December
Special Meeting as follows:
As elections go, this one might have been devised in the old Kremlin: Conrail
shareholders are scheduled to vote December 23 on a proposal that will likely
decide the Philadelphia railroad's future. If they approve the management endorsed
proposal, Conrail's planned $8.5 billion merger with CSX Corp. will move forward.
If the shareholders don't approve.., they won't vote.
In other words, count ballots first, then hold the vote - after we've won.
Id. 71 (quoting The Philadelphia Inquirer, November 28, 1996.
49. See id. 75.
50. See id.
51. Following the First Amendment to the Merger Agreement, Conrail no longer unilaterally
controlled whether or not the December Special Meeting would be convened, adjourned or
postponed. As revised by the First Amendment to the Merger Agreement, Section 5.1(b) of the
Merger Agreement now provides, inter alia, that Conrail "shall not convene, adjourn or postpone
the [Conrail] Pennsylvania Shareholders Meeting without the prior consent of [CSX], which
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld."
52. See id. 19.
53. Transcript of Hearing 71-72 (Dec. 17, 1996) (hereinafter December Bench Ruling); see
also Complaint, supra note 6, 77.
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they had adopted the Second Amendment to the Merger Agreement.
Pursuant to the Second Amendment, the Conrail stockholders would
receive, in addition to the cash and stock previously offered, convertible
preferred stock to be valued at $16 per share. 54 Finally, Conrail and
CSX announced that the Second Amendment to the Merger Agreement
had extended the expiration date for the Lock-Out provision to Decem-
ber 31, 1998."1 Conrail also announced that, due to these changes, the
special meeting of stockholders to consider and vote upon the Charter
Amendment, previously scheduled to be held on December 23, 1997,
instead would be held on January 17, 1997 (the "January Special
Meeting"). 6
G. Norfolk Raises Its Cash Offer to $115 Per Share
Within hours of CSX's announcement, Norfolk announced that it
had increased its cash offer to $115 per share (the "Revised Norfolk
Offer").57 Pursuant to the Revised Norfolk Offer, the Conrail stockhold-
ers would receive a premium of more than $12 per share over the
blended value of CSX's revised cash and stock proposal for Conrail (or
an aggregate premium of approximately $1 billion over the CSX
Proposal)."
H. The Third Preliminary Injunction Hearing
In a hearing before the district court on January 9, 1997, Norfolk
argued that Conrail's adoption of a two year lock-out constituted an
abdication by the board of its fiduciary duties. Therefore, Norfolk main-
tained, the court should declare the lock-out to be ultra vires.59 How-
ever, the court remained untroubled by the length of the lock-out,
holding that:
54. See Complaint, supra note 6, 79. According to The Wall Street Journal, the Third CSX
Offer, including the Convertible Preferred Stock, was worth $102 per share. See Steven Lipin &
Ana Wilde Mathews, Norfolk Sweetens Hostile Bid for Conrail Hours After CSX Raises Friendly
Offer. WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1996, at A3.
55. See Complaint, supra note 6, 79.
56. See id. 20.
57. See Second Supplement to the Offer to Purchase for Cash Dated October 24, 1996 (Dec.
20, 1996); see also Complaint, supra note 6, 20, 82.
58. See Complaint, supra note 6, 22.
59. Transcript of Hearing 68-69 (Jan. 9, 1997) (hereinafter January Bench Ruling). As noted
earlier, the scope of this article is limited to an examination of the lock-ups agreed to by the
Conrail Board. Consequently, although the plaintiffs raised other, unrelated, contentions at this
hearing, including an allegation that CSX and the Conrail directors and senior management,
alleged to be acting in concert, had triggered the fair value provisions of PBCL Chapter 25E
because the shares of Conrail owned by its directors and senior management be aggregated with
the 19.9% of Conrail's stock purchased by CSX, this Article does not examine the issues raised by
such discussion.
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As to the 720-day period no-shop or lockout period...
I see no principled reason.., as to why the lockout could not extend
for the full period of the contract, nor is there any reason to think that
any particular line of demarcation need be drawn so far as the facts of
this case presently before me are concerned. After all, as it seems to
me, and I think I expressed this previously, that where a contract is
entered into, it is expected that the parties will act in good faith and
will not deliberately go out and attempt to shop the contract, if you
will, with some other party or to see if they can get a better deal after
having entered into a valid contract. 60
In addition, the court concluded that the Conrail board had not
erred when it agreed to a lock-out without a fiduciary out.61 According
to the court, even if the Conrail board were to develop a fiduciary duty
in the future to "go ahead and take some action by reason of some offer
that had been made," the court saw no "reason why [it] should make any
difference that [the fiduciary out] is not specifically set forth in the con-
tract."' 62 In the court's view:
if a contract imposes upon certain of the parties certain fiduciary
duties, it seems to me that [the fiduciary duties] then become[ ] prac-
tically an unwritten term of the contract of the agreement. And there-
fore whether this one did not have such a fiduciary duty opt-out and
the earlier one did seems to me should make no difference. In addi-
tion to which there has been absolutely no showing or [ ] claim that
any situation has arisen as yet or will or is likely to arise in the future
that would impose any sort of fiduciary duty upon the board of direc-
tors to disregard the lockout or the no-shop provisions of the merger
agreement. 63
For these reasons, the court denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the lock-out provision.'
III. DELAWARE LAW
When negotiating an acquisition that will be governed by Delaware
law, the board of directors of an acquirer frequently attempts to protect
the negotiated deal (and ensure its completion) by including "lock-up"
provisions in the acquisition agreement. The board of directors of the
Delaware target, on the other hand, usually will agree to include such
lock-up provisions if the board determines that the provisions will assist
the board in negotiating the highest and best offer for the company. It is
60. Id. at 149-50.
61. See id. at 150-51.
62. Id. at 150.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 161.
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the tension between these two competing and frequently opposing uses
for lock-up devices and the circumstances under which these lock-ups
are being adopted which must be carefully considered by the directors of
a Delaware target when they agree to include such defensive provisions
in the agreement acquisition.
In transactions governed by Delaware law, the board of Delaware
target typically will be asked by the acquiror to include one or more of
the following types of lock-up provisions in the acquisition agreement:
a. a stock option, pursuant to which a holder receives an irrevo-
cable option to purchase a substantial portion of the com-
pany's stock;6
5
b. a termination or "break-up" fee, in a negotiated amount
designed to compensate the bidder if another bidder prevails
and which is similar to a liquidated damages provision;
66
c. "no shop" or "window shop" provisions, which limit the
board's ability to solicit or communicate with other potential
bidders; 67
d. a "topping" fee, to be paid to the original bidder if the com-
pany accepts another bidder's offer and which is based upon
a negotiated percentage of the amount by which the subse-
quent offeror's bid exceeds the original bid;68
e. an expense reimbursement provision, which is designed to
compensate a bidder for its actual or estimated out-of-pocket
expenses in the event that another bidder ultimately
prevails; 69
f. an asset option, pursuant to which the bidder receives an
irrevocable option to purchase at a negotiated price a particu-
larly desirable asset or division of the company. 70
As a general matter, such lock-ups are not considered to be per se
65. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); In
re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at *3,
(Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. Nos. 9536 & 9561, 1988 WL
8772, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988).
66. See Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 13, 1990); In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
67. See QVC, 637 A.2d 34; In re Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *15-16; Lewis v. Leaseway
Transp. Corp., C.A. No. 8720, 1990 WL 67383, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990).
68. See In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10278, 1990 WL 201385 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 13, 1990).
69. See Kahn v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 12489, 1996 WL 159628, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996).
70. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); In re Holly
Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1988).
[Vol. 51:677
THE CSXICONRAIL EXPRESS
illegal under Delaware law.7' To the contrary, in the majority of the
decisions considering the validity of particular lock-up provisions, the
Delaware courts have upheld their reasonable use and have recognized
their potential benefits to the stockholders of Delaware corporations.
For example, the Delaware courts have approved the use of termination
fees, topping fees and expense reimbursement provisions where the fees
or expenses are capped at a percentage of the value of the proposed
transaction (typically 1-2%).7" The Delaware courts also have recog-
nized that it may be appropriate for a board to grant a bidder an option to
purchase as much as 20% of the company's capital stock.73 Finally,
provided that the target company is afforded the opportunity to respond
to legitimate unsolicited offers, the Delaware courts generally have
given approval to the use of no-shop and window shop provisions.74
However, before a Delaware court will consider the propriety of a
challenged lock-up provision in an acquisition agreement, the court must
resolve the threshold issue of determining the appropriate standard of
review under which the lock-up will be considered.
A. Standards of Review
An analysis of the appropriate standard of review to be applied by
the Delaware courts first requires a discussion of the business judgment
rule. Under Delaware corporate law, the business and affairs of a Dela-
ware corporation are to be managed by or under the direction of its
board of directors. In recognition of the managerial prerogatives granted
to directors of Delaware corporations, Delaware law presumes that, in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation were disinter-
ested and acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.75
Under an application of the business judgment rule, the judgment
of the board of directors will be respected by the Delaware courts if,
upon review, the court concludes the directors' decision can be attrib-
71. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1284.
72. See, e.g., In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 22, 1989); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 781-83 (Del. Ch. 1988); Lewis, 1990
WL 67383; Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 13, 1990). But see QVC, 637 A.2d at 49-51.
73. See, e.g., In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 12085, 1991
WL 238816, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., C.A. No. 8486,
1986 WL 5840 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. Nos. 9536 &
9561, 1991 WL 165304 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988). But see QVC, 637 A.2d at 49-51.
74. See, e.g., In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10278, 1990 WL 201385 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 13, 1990) In re Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816.
75. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141.
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uted to any rational business purpose.76 If there is a challenge to the
decision of the board and the business judgment rule is applicable, the
burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebut-
ting the presumption of the business judgment rule.7 7 As with any deci-
sion of the board of directors, as a general rule the use of lock-ups is a
function of a board's business judgment and, therefore, absent certain
circumstances of the type discussed below, if there is any rational busi-
ness purpose for the use of lock-up provisions, a Delaware court will not
interfere with the board's decision to grant such lock-up provisions.
Where, however, the board agrees to lock-ups in response to a hostile
threat to the control of the company, the board's decision to adopt such
provisions will implicate the enhanced judicial scrutiny mandated by
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc.78
Under Unocal, before a board may be entitled to the protections
afforded by the business judgment rule, the board of directors must
demonstrate that it had reasonable grounds to believe that a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that the defensive meas-
ures adopted were reasonable in relation to the threat posed.79 The first
prong of Unocal is satisfied by a showing that a reasonable investigation
into the threat was undertaken in good faith. The second prong of Uno-
cal focuses on whether the challenged measures were either preclusive
or coercive and, if not, whether the measures fell within a "range of
reasonableness." 80
If the plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption of the business
judgment rule in challenging a lock-up device or if the majority of the
board is found to be interested in the transaction which contains the
lock-up provisions, the Delaware courts will examine the board of direc-
tors' actions under the entire fairness standard set forth in Weinberger.81
In an entire fairness test context, directors of a Delaware corporation
must demonstrate
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of
the bargain .... The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its
demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has
the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test
of careful scrutiny by the courts.8 2
76. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995).
77. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812.
78. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
79. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989);
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946.
80. Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1387-88; QVC, 637 A.2d at 45-46.
81. See Weinberger v. VOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); see also Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995); Unitrin, Inc., 651 A.2d at 1377, n.18.
82. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
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Under the entire fairness standard, the board of directors must
establish "to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was the product
of both fair dealing and fair price."83 In analyzing whether there has
been fair dealing, the Delaware courts consider questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated and
disclosed to the directors and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.84 In considering the issue of fair price, the
court analyzes the economic and financial considerations of the pro-
posed transaction, including all relevant factors.8 5
While the test is typically denominated in two parts, the test is not
bifurcated between fair dealing and fair price. Under the relevant law,
"all aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question
is one of entire fairness. '"86 In making its determination, the Delaware
Chancery Court must "carefully analyze the factual circumstances, apply
a disciplined balancing test to its findings, and articulate the bases upon
which it decides the ultimate question of entire fairness. 87
Finally, a Delaware court would consider whether the Conrail
board had a duty under Revlon to act reasonably to seek the transaction
offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders, and the
board must exercise its fiduciary duties to further that goal.88 In the
context of any sale or change or control, the Delaware courts will apply
enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the directors have acted reasonably.89
The key features of an enhanced scrutiny test are (i) a judicial determi-
nation regarding the adequacy of the decision making process employed
by the directors, including the information on which the directors based
their decision,9" and (ii) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of
the directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing.9' In
these circumstances, the directors will have "the burden of proving that
they were adequately informed and acted reasonably." 92
While the Delaware courts recognize that there is "no single
blueprint" that a board must follow in connection with a sale, the Dela-
83. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 856
(Del. 1994).
84. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995).
88. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
89. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 43; Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 11639, 1990
WL 118356, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990).
90. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
91. See id.; Roberts, 1990 WL 118356, at *8.
92. QVC, 637 A.2d at 45.
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ware decisions suggest that a board may determine the existence and
viability of possible alternatives through a number of methods, includ-
ing, but not limited to, an auction, a canvassing of the market, or the
gathering of enough reliable evidence to enable the board to render an
informed decision. 93 The overriding principle guiding the board's judg-
ment when selling a company must be the scrupulous adherence to ordi-
nary principles of fairness in whatever form the sale takes, whether in
the form of an active auction, a buyout or a restructuring. 94
Before Delaware law will impose such special obligations on the
board of directors, the corporation must undertake a transaction that will
cause either a sale or change of control of the corporate entity.95 How-
ever, where two public companies are widely held and neither company
has a controlling stockholder or stockholder group, a stock for stock
merger between the two companies will not constitute a change of con-
trol.96 Absent a change of control, the board may, consistent with its
fiduciary duties, prefer a preexisting transaction without becoming sub-
ject to Revlon duties97 and the board of directors has "the prerogative...
to resist a third party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or offer."98
B. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-ups under the Unocal Standard
In In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Lit., the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's decision dismissing plain-
tiffs' Unocal claim relating to the reasonableness of a termination fee
and expense reimbursement provision in a merger agreement between
Santa Fe and Burlington Northern. In originally dismissing plaintiffs'
duty of loyalty claim, the chancery court first noted that the complaint
failed to allege that the board did not reasonably perceive a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness.99 Second, the chancery court
rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the $50 million termination fee was
"coercive" under the second prong of Unocal and held that the defensive
measures adopted by the Board (including the termination fee) were a
"reasonable, proportionate response to the threat posed."' 00 The chan-
93. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 44; Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del.
1989).
94. See Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del. 1988).
95. See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995); QVC,
637 A.2d at 48.
96. See In re Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 71.
97. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1151; In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litig., C.A. No.
13587, 1995 WL 334258, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part, 669 A. 2d 59
(Del. 1995).
98. QVC, 637 A.2d at 43 n.13.
99. In re Santa Fe, 1995 WL 334258, at *9.
100. In re Santa Fe, 1995 WL 334258, at *11.
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cery court, relying on QVC, noted in a footnote that
[u]nder Delaware law, the Santa Fe board was free to agree to reason-
able termination fees and expenses .... Given the magnitude of the
transaction in question (over $3.5 billion), nothing alleged in the
complaint gives rise to a claim that the $50 million termination fee
and the $10 million dollar expense reimbursement provision were not
reasonable.'0°
The Delaware Supreme Court held, however, that the chancery
court erred in dismissing plaintiff's Unocal claim because the court had
relied on evidence outside of the complaint to reach its conclusion.
According to the court, enhanced judicial scrutiny generally will not be
satisfied by resting on a defense motion merely attacking the pleadings.
Thus, the supreme court reversed the dismissal of the Unocal claim on
technical grounds and never reached the merits of the court of chan-
cery's decision.10 2
C. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-ups under the Entire
Fairness Standard
Under Delaware law, directors are required to demonstrate both
their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of a
transaction in which they possess a financial, business or other personal
interest which does not devolve upon the corporation or all stockholders
generally."0 3 When directors of Delaware corporations are faced with
such divided loyalties, the directors have the burden of establishing the
entire fairness of the transaction such that it will survive careful scrutiny
by the courts.10 4
In Cinerama, Technicolor's board agreed to a two-tiered tender
offer proposal by MacAndrews & Forbes. Several months after the
tender offer was completed, Technicolor completed the merger pursuant
to the previously agreed upon merger agreement. In the subsequent law-
suit brought by Cinerama, a shareholder of Technicolor, Cinerama
argued that the merger was not the product of fair dealing. Specifically,
Cinerama alleged that the transaction was unfairly structured because it
101. In re Santa Fe, 1995 WL 334258, at *10 n.8.
102. See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 72 (Del. 1995); see also
Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp, C.A. Nos. 14696 & 14623, 1996 WL 32169, at *6
(Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996). In refusing to dismiss the Unocal claim relating to certain lock-ups, the
chancery court noted that it was "tempted to agree" with defendants' argument that the break-up
fees and stock option, which together represented a cost of approximately 2% of the transaction
value, were not coercive or preclusive or outside a range of reasonableness, but left that final
decision for fuller development in the litigation in light of the supreme court's decision in Santa
Fe.
103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
104. See Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988).
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"unquestionably 'inhibited... alternative bids.'" In addition, the plain-
tiff further alleged that the transaction was "locked up, included a no-
shop provision, and gave Technicolor no 'out,' i.e., no right to termi-
nate." '0 5 In rejecting this entire fairness argument, the Delaware
Supreme Court observed that
Cinerama's assertion that the merger agreement included a 'no-shop'
clause that 'inhibit[ed] [the] board's ability to negotiate with other
potential bidders' is not supported by the record. Although it is true
that Technicolor could not shop for competing bids, it successfully
preserved its right to provide information to, and engage in discus-
sions with, competing bidders.10 6
D. Delaware Cases Analyzing Lock-ups under the Revlon Standard
Not surprisingly, the majority of the cases in Delaware that con-
sider the propriety of lock-ups are those in which the board agreed to
lock-ups in connection with a sale of the company. It is under these
circumstances that shareholder plaintiffs and potential bidders perceive
the most harm from the use of lock-ups, most specifically as "show stop-
pers" or possible deterrents to further bidding. If the board of directors
of a Delaware corporation determines to engage in a transaction in
which control of the corporation will change, the directors are required
to critically evaluate whether all material aspects of the proposed trans-
action, including any lock-ups, both separately and in the aggregate, are
reasonable and in the best interests of the stockholders.0 7 Typically, a
board of directors' Revlon duties have been analyzed in one of three
contexts: a sale of the company involving a single bidder where the
board has reliable evidence as to the fairness of the transaction, a sale of
the company involving a single bidder where the board relies upon a
subsequent market check to verify the fairness of the transaction, or a
sale of the company involving multiple bidders.
Where directors are considering' a single offer and they possess a
"body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a trans-
action, they may approve that transaction without conducting an active
survey of the market."'0 8  In Barkan, for example, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court's finding that the board,
despite agreeing during negotiations to the imposition of a no-shop pro-
105. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1173 (Del. 1995).
106. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1173.
107. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994).
108. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989); see also In re Vitalink
Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 12085, 1991 WL 238816, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 8, 1991).
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vision, had sufficient knowledge of the relevant markets to form a basis
for its belief that it had acted in the best interests of the stockholders
when it subsequently approved management's buy out of the com-
pany. 10 9 In In re Vitalink, the chancery court, in reaching its conclusion
that the Vitalink board had a sufficient basis of reliable evidence to
enable it to reasonably conclude that it was getting the best deal possible
for the stockholders, agreed with Vitalink's arguments that the lock-up
option, the no-shop clause and the termination fee were minimal impedi-
ments to an implicit market test.110
Where directors are considering a single offer and they do not have
reliable grounds upon which to judge the adequacy of the offer, "a con-
cern for fairness demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher
bids may be elicited."' " In In re Vitalink, the chancery court concluded
that the actions of the Vitalink board did not constitute a canvass of the
market. Nonetheless, the court held that the no-shop clause, which was
subject to a fiduciary out clause, the stock option, which was for 19.9%
of the company's common stock, and the termination fee of $2,771,331,
which represented slightly less than 1.9% of the value of the transaction,
did not prevent the company from canvassing the market." 2 In In re
KDI Corp. Shareholders Litigation, a special committee of the board of
directors of KDI entered into a merger agreement with management pur-
suant to which the company and the special committee agreed not to
solicit any other offer for the company. In granting defendants' motion
to dismiss the complaint, the Vice Chancellor noted that the company
was "in play" for nearly three months before the merger agreement was
executed and, during that time, the company's investment banker con-
tacted nearly 100 potential purchasers. In the court's view, these facts
plus the fact that the agreement with the no-shop provision was not exe-
cuted "until the process of selling KDI was at a close.. . ." negate[d] any
inference that the Special Committee acted without due care.' 13
Where multiple bidders are attempting to bid for control of a com-
109. See Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1288.
110. See In re Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *12.
111. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287; see also In re Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *6; In re Fort
Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147, at *13 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8,
1988), appeal denied, 547 A.2d 633 (Del. 1988).
112. See In re Vitalink, 1991 WL 238816, at *7.
113. In re KDI Shareholders, 1990 WL 201385, at *4; compare Rand v. Western Airlines, Inc.,
C.A. No. 8632, 1989 WL 104933, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (refusing to dismiss complaint's
Revlon claim where there were no other bidders for company and complaint alleged that 30%
stock option had been granted to only bidder, that no fairness opinion was obtained on price of the
stock option, that merger agreement contained a no-shop clause, and that merger price was
slightly less than company's recent trading price and approximately half of its alleged asset and
synergy value).
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pany, a concern for fairness forbids directors from using defensive
mechanisms to thwart an auction or to favor one bidder over another.II 4
While the Delaware courts have held that lock-up and no-shop provi-
sions are not per se illegal, the courts recognize that such measures
"often foreclose further bidding to the detriment of shareholders, and
end active auctions prematurely."' 1 5 For an auction-ending provision to
be appropriate, the provision "must confer a substantial benefit upon the
stockholders in order to withstand exacting scrutiny by the courts."' 1 6
Before the board agrees to include various lock-ups in an acquisition
agreement, the board must consider whether the lock-ups in question
would adversely affect the value provided to the stockholders, inhibit or
encourage alternative bids, remain enforceable contractual obligations in
light of the directors' fiduciary obligations, and ultimately advance or
retard the directors' obligation to secure for the stockholders the best
value reasonably available under the circumstances. 17
In Revlon, during an active auction for the sale of control of the
company, the Revlon board accepted a revised offer from Forstmann
Little which contained a lock-up option to purchase certain of Revlon's
important assets at below market prices, a no-shop provision and a $25
million termination fee. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., the
other bidder for Revlon, sought to enjoin the asset lock-up, the no-shop
and the termination fee provisions of the merger agreement. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court upheld the chancery court's invalidation of these
lock-up provisions. The court held that, once the board permitted man-
agement to negotiate a merger or a buy-out, there was a recognition that
the company was for sale. In such circumstances, the duty of the board
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the
maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' ben-.
efit." 8 The court then went on to consider the lock-ups, noting that,
while those lock-ups which draw bidders into the battle benefit share-
holders, similar measures which end an active auction and foreclose fur-
ther bidding operate to the shareholders' detriment. The court noted that
while the no-shop provision was not illegal per se, its use is "impermis-
sible" when the board has determined to sell the company and the board
is responsible for selling the company to the highest bidder." 9 Simi-
larly, with respect to the asset option, the court determined that the
114. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182-85 (Del. 1986).
115. Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1988).
116. Id.; see also Rand, 1989 WL 104933, at *
117. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994).
118. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
119. Id. at 184.
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option was not used to foster the bidding. Rather, the court held that the
option was used to "destroy" the bidding process, especially where the
asset option was granted for little additional consideration and at below
market prices. 2° Finally, the supreme court affirmed the ruling of the
chancery court enjoining the termination fee, finding that such fee was
part of the overall plan to thwart the bidding process.1 21
In Macmillan, in the midst of a heated auction for the sale of the
company, and in the face of an offer by Maxwell to top any other offer,
the board of directors of Macmillan accepted a bid from and entered into
a merger agreement with KKR. The merger agreement included an asset
lock-up for the purchase of seven Macmillan subsidiaries for $865 mil-
lion, a no-shop provision, an expense reimbursement provision and a
breakup fee of $29.3 million. Maxwell, the other bidder for Macmillan,
sought to enjoin the asset lock-up agreement and the breakup fees and
expenses granted by the Macmillan board to KKR. Although the chan-
cery court denied the requested injunction, the supreme court reversed.
In reviewing the asset lock-up and no-shop provisions, the court
noted that while such agreements are not per se illegal, nevertheless they
"often foreclose further bidding to the detriment of shareholders, and
end active actions prematurely."1 22 According to the supreme court, "if
the grant of such an auction ending provision is appropriate, it must
confer a substantial benefit upon the stockholders in order to withstand
exacting scrutiny by the Courts."'' 23 When, however, the decision of the
directors granting such lock-ups was not informed or was induced by
breaches of fiduciary duties, such lock-ups cannot survive.1 24
As for the asset lock-up option given to KKR, the court determined
that the option was not necessary to draw any bidders into the contest
and that Macmillan did not receive, in exchange for the lock-up, a bid
which materially enhanced stockholder interests. According to the
court, "when one compares what KKR received for the lock-up, in con-
trast to its inconsiderable offer, the invalidity of the agreement becomes
patent."' 25 Of particular note, the supreme court was concerned with an
asset lock-up involving the company's "crown jewels," those particu-
larly valuable or desirable assets or lines of business of the target com-
pany. While the court indicated that a lock-up of such assets may be
permissible, the granting by the board of that lock-up must involve care-
ful scrutiny. Where such a lock-up is granted to end an active auction,
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Mills Acquisition Corp. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del. 1988).
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 1286.
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the board must attempt to negotiate alternative bids before granting such
a significant concession. 26 With respect to the no-shop clause granted
to KKR, the court noted that the use of such a device is even more
limited than a lock-up agreement. According to the court, "[a]bsent a
material advantage to the stockholders from the terms or structure of a
bid that is contingent on a no-shop clause, a successful bidder imposing
such a condition must be prepared to survive the careful scrutiny which
that concession demands.' 27 Finally, while the supreme Court did not
directly address the propriety of the break-up fee and the reimbursement
of expenses provisions of the KKR merger agreement, the court did
completely reverse the chancery court's decision, including that portion
of the decision which refused to enjoin those provisions. 128 Thus, it can
be assumed that the court found those provisions, granted under the cir-
cumstances of this case, to be objectionable as well.
In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the court of chan-
cery's preliminary injunction preventing the implementation of no-shop
and stock option provisions in a merger agreement between Paramount
and Viacom. In addressing QVC's challenge to these lock-ups, the
supreme court concluded that Paramount had put itself up for sale and,
in that context, the Paramount board did not pay sufficient attention to
"the potential consequences of the defensive measures demanded by
Viacom." These consequences included (i) upon certain triggering
events, the option either to purchase, with a senior subordinated note of
questionable value, approximately 19.9% of Paramount's outstanding
common stock at $69.14 per share or to require Paramount to pay
Viacom in cash a sum equal to the immediate cash value of such option,
and (ii) a no-shop provision that "inhibited the Paramount Board's abil-
ity to negotiate with other potential bidders, particularly QVC which had
already expressed an interest in Paramount."' 12 9 Under these circum-
stances, the supreme court concluded, "it should have been clear to the
Paramount Board that the Stock Option Agreement, coupled with the
Termination Fee and the No-Shop Clause, were impeding the realization
of the best value reasonably available to the Paramount stockholders."',3
For that reason, the court found the stock option agreement and the no-
shop clause were improperly designed to deter potential bidders and,
consequently, were invalid and unenforceable.' 3'
The supreme court's decision in QVC is also important for what it
126. See id. at 1286.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 1288.
129. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 (Del. 1994).
130. Id. at 50.
131. See id. at 51.
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did not decide. First, while the chancery court determined preliminarily
that a $100 million termination fee, which represented only 1.2% of the
value of the original transaction fee, was reasonable, the issue was not
appealed by either party to the supreme court.' 3 2 Therefore, the supreme
court could only note that the termination fee "whether or not unreason-
able by itself, clearly made Paramount less attractive to other bidders,
when coupled with the [stock option].' 33 While this dicta suggests that
the Delaware courts will consider the aggregate effect of all of the lock-
ups, we are left without binding precedent to that effect. Second, the
court declined to express an opinion as to "whether a stock option agree-
ment of essentially this magnitude, but with a reasonable 'cap' and with-
out the Note and Put Features, would be valid or invalid under other
circumstances."'1 34  Thus, it remains unclear under Delaware law at
what point a stock option becomes too large or too costly. Finally, in
discussing the lock-ups in question, the court observed that such con-
tractual provisions "may not validly define or limit the directors' fiduci-
ary duties under Delaware law or prevent ... directors from carrying out
their fiduciary duties under Delaware law" and, therefore, Viacom did
not have any vested contract rights arising from such provisions. 13 5
In In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation, the board of
Holly Farms was faced with two competing bidders for the company:
ConAgra and Tyson. In the face of Tyson's tender offer, Holly Farms,
after investigating alternatives to the Tyson offer, determined that a sale
of the company was in the best interests of the stockholders of Holly
Farms, and the board thereupon accepted an offer from ConAgra which
included an option to purchase Holly Farms' prime poultry operation,
a termination fee of $15 million and an agreement to reimburse
ConAgra's expenses. 136 The chancery court granted Tyson's request for
a preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin the effectuation of these
lock-ups. Although the Holly Farms board determined to sell the corpo-
ration and, therefore, should have assumed the role of auctioneer, the
court found that the record "conclusively shows, however, that an auc-
tion aimed at maximizing shareholder value never really took place.' 37
According to the court, while a lock-up may be rational if it encourages
a bidder to make an offer, a lock-up that ends an active auction and
132. See QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245, 1271 (Del.
Ch. 1993).
133. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49.
134. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49 n.19.
135. QVC, 637 A.2d at 48, 50.
136. See In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, at
*2-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
137. Id. at *4.
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precludes further bidding is "extremely suspect."'138 Under such circum-
stances, the court concluded, the board's decision to grant a lock-up, the
termination fee and the expense reimbursement were improper because
they each appeared to have been part of an effort to "preclude a genuine
auction." 3 9
In Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., plaintiffs claimed that Sea-
Land's directors violated their duty to obtain the highest possible bid for
the stockholders' stock when the directors granted a 21.7% stock option
to CSX. 140 Noting that the stock option "was granted at the conclusion
(and not, as in Revlon, in the midst) of the auction process," and there-
fore the lock-up did not "shut out a bidder that was prepared to offer a
higher price" for the shares, the chancery court denied plaintiffs' appli-
cation for a temporary restraining order. 4'
Similarly, in In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., plaintiffs alleged that
the topping fee and reimbursement of expenses provision both impeded
an effective auction and, therefore, the board, by agreeing to such provi-
sions, violated its Revlon duties. 14 2 Rejecting plaintiffs' claim, Chancel-
lor Allen held that the topping fee arrangement, while having the effect
of giving one bidder an advantage, still may benefit the company's
stockholders if it is responsible for producing another bid. In such a
case, the court concluded, the topping fee is not "inconsistent with the
board's duty to seek the best available transaction for the sharehold-
ers."' 43 The court also concluded that similar considerations governed
the analysis of the $17 million termination fee (1% of the transaction
value).' 1 Such fees are "reasonably conventional" and where,
as appears to be the case here, such a provision is negotiated in good
faith by the board with no apparent conflict, that is well-advised and
follows a responsible, deliberate procedure, [the court] is at a loss as
to know what basis exists for declaring such a provision a violation of
a shareholders' rights. 141
Finally, in Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., plaintiffs sought to
enjoin an all-cash tender offer arguing that the stock option, expense
reimbursement provision, window shop clause and management incen-
138. Id. at *6; see also Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583 (Del. Ch. 1984).
139. In re Holly Farms, 1988 WL 143010, at *6.
140. See Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., C.A. No. 8486, 1986 WL 5840, at *4 (Del. Ch.
May 19, 1986).
141. Id. at *4; see also In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 806 n.19 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 633 A.2d 371 (Del. 1993) (holding that grant of Sea-Land option was reasonably
calculated to induce higher, firm bid from CSX and, therefore, was not fiduciary duty violation).
142. See In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 778-81 (Del. Ch. 1988).
143. Id. at 782.
144. See id. at 783.
145. Id.
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tive and compensation arrangements agreed to by the directors of the
company effectively locked up the company and chilled further competi-
tive bids.'4 6 In rejecting plaintiffs' claims, the chancery court noted that
there had been no showing that these "arrangements constituted the type
of provisions condemned as 'lock-up' devices that improperly preclude
competing bids in an active auction."' 47 Reviewing the reasonableness
of each lock-up, the court held that (i) the expense reimbursement provi-
sion and the grant of an option to acquire 16% of the company's com-
mon stock only imposed a modest additional cost on any other bidder,
but they were necessary in order to induce an offer from the original
bidder at a premium over market, (ii) the window shop clause permitted
the company to cooperate with a bona fide higher bidder and was con-
sistent with the board's fiduciary duties, and (iii) there was no showing
that the directors acted improperly in agreeing to the management incen-
tive and compensation arrangements, which were negotiated after the
deal price was established.'48
IV. AN APPLICATION OF DELAWARE LAW TO THE
CONRAILICSX MERGER
A. Analyzing the Conrail/CSX Lock-ups Under the Unocal Standard
In reviewing the Conrail board's decision to agree to lock-up provi-
sions in connection with its proposed merger with CSX, a Delaware
court first would have to determine whether the lock-up provisions were
defensive measures adopted in response to a threat posed by a potential
hostile bidder 4 9 or were they bargained for by CSX and agreed to by
Conrail as merely another component of the proposed merger. If the
latter is the case, then the Conrail board's decision would have been
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule. If the former is
the case, then Conrail would have been required to demonstrate that it
had reasonable grounds to believe that a threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed and that the lock-up provisions were reasonable in
relation to the threat which Conrail presumably anticipated would be
posed by Norfolk or any other bidder(s). 50 If the Conrail board would
have been able to demonstrate that it had such "reasonable grounds" and
that the defensive measures taken were within "a range of reasonable-
ness," then the Conrail board's decision to adopt the lock-ups would be
146. See Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. Nos. 9536 & 9561, 1988 WL 8772, at *4
(Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988).
147. Id. at 5.
148. See id. at *7 n.6.
149. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
150. See id.
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entitled to the protections afforded by the business judgment rule. If the
business judgment rule applied, a Delaware court would defer to the
Conrail board's decision if there was any rational business purpose for
agreeing to the lock-up provisions.''
In determining whether the lock-up provisions were "defensive
measures," it is helpful to consider the lock-ups agreed to prior to the
announcement of the Norfolk Offer on October 23, 1996, separate from
amendments to those lock-ups (or any new lock-ups) adopted or agreed
to by the Conrail board after that announcement. At first blush, it would
appear that the lock-up provisions that were agreed to in connection with
the proposed Conrail/CSX merger should be entitled to the protections
of the business judgment rule because the Conrail/CSX merger was
announced on October 15, 1996, 52 more than one week before the Nor-
folk offer. However, certain allegations made by Norfolk in its com-
plaint suggest that Conrail may have intended, nonetheless, that the
lock-up provisions to serve as defensive measures.
According to Norfolk, in the two years preceding the announce-
ment of the Conrail/CSX merger, members of senior management of
Norfolk, including David R. Goode, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Norfolk, had spoken on a number of occasions with senior
management of Conrail, including then Conrail Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, James A. Hagen, and current Conrail Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, David W. LeVan, concerning a possible busi-
ness combination between Norfolk and Conrail.' 53 According to Nor-
folk, as recently as late September of 1994, Norfolk and Conrail had
been negotiating a proposed stock for stock merger of Conrail and Nor-
folk.' 54 In light of the foregoing, a Delaware court may well conclude
that the lock-ups were, in fact, defensive mechanisms and therefore sub-
ject the Conrail board's decision to adopt those lock-ups to enhanced
judicial scrutiny under Unocal.
Whether the lock-up provisions (including the lock-out) were
intended to be defensive measures or not, the decision of the Conrail
board to amend the Merger Agreement less than two weeks after the
Norfolk Proposal in order, inter alia, to extend the lock-out provision to
nine months (and later to more than two years) does appear to have been
defensive in nature and, consequently, a Delaware court should subject
at least the board's decision to extend the lock-out to the enhanced judi-
151. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del. 1995).
152. See Oct. 15 Conrail Press Release, supra note 6.
153. See Complaint, supra note 6, 23.
154. See id. 26.
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cial scrutiny articulated in Unocal.t"
Under Unocal, the Conrail directors would have the burden of
establishing that they had reasonable grounds to believe that a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed and that the defensive meas-
ures adopted were reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 156 The first
prong of the Unocal test is satisfied by showing that a reasonable inves-
tigation was undertaken by the board in good faith. 157 The second prong
of Unocal turns on whether the defensive measures are preclusive or
coercive and, if not, whether the measures fall within a "range of reason-
able-ness."' I5 8 Here, the pleadings may not be fairly characterized as
having demonstrated, and the decisions of the district court did not
address, whether a "reasonable investigation" of a perceived threat was
undertaken in good faith. However, even if such an investigation was
undertaken by the Conrail board, under the second prong of Unocal, the
authors believe that several of the lock-out provisions are nevertheless
arguably outside the range of reasonableness.
Although typically the Delaware courts have approved of termina-
tion fees and expense reimbursement provisions that are in the range of
1-2% of the value of the proposed transaction,' 59 in this case the termi-
nation fee of $300 million 60 represented nearly 3.75% of the value of
the initial offer of CSX (valued at slightly over $8.0 billion).' 6' Simi-
larly, while the stock option in this case is for a modest percentage of the
shares of Conrail,1 61 the stock option is not capped to limit its maximum
dollar value. Thus, as the price of Conrail stock appreciated during the
course of the bidding war between CSX and Norfolk, the cash value of
the stock option also increased. In QVC, the Delaware Supreme Court
was critical of another stock option that was not capped and referred to
the option as both "unusual" and "draconian" in its application. The
155. See In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litig., C.A. No. 13587 1995 WL 334258 at
*9 n.7 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1995). In footnote 7 of that opinion, the chancery court observed that
"once the board determined to alter the [transaction] in response to the unwanted [bid], the altered
transaction ... became subject to enhanced scrutiny under Unocal." Id.
156. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989).
157. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
158. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995).
159. See, e.g., In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 10598, 1989 WL 25812 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 22, 1989); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 A.2d 770, 781-83 (Del. Ch. 1988); Lewis
v. Leaseway Trans. Corp., C.A. No. 8720, 1990 WL 67383 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990); Roberts v.
General Instrument Corp., C.A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990).
160. See Merger Agreement, supra note 11, § 5.9(b).
161. See Lipin & Machalaba, supra note 1, at A3.
162. On several occasions the Delaware courts have declined to invalidate options considerable
larger than CSX's 10% option. See, e.g., In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders
Litig., C.A. No. 12985, 1991 WL 238816, at *6, 12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1991); Hecco Ventures v.
Sea-Land Corp., C.A. No. 8486, 1986 WL 5840, AT *4-5 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986); Yanow v.
Scientific Leasing, Inc., C.A. Nos. 9536 & 9561, 1988 WL 8772 at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988.
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authors also believe that a Delaware court would be troubled by the
board's agreement not to amend the company's poison pill without the
consent of a third party. Such an agreement eliminates Conrail's other-
wise unilateral right to amend the poison pill in order to effect an alter-
native transaction with another bidder, irrespective of the price offered
or the conditions of the deal and is at least facially incompatible with the
rationale for a deal. The authors are not aware of any Delaware decision
that has condoned such a result. To the contrary, the Delaware courts
have indicated that circumstances may arise where a board will no
longer be justified in maintaining a poison pill in order to prevent the
shareholders from accepting the offer. 163 Since the Conrail board's
agreement not to amend the poison pill without the consent of CSX
leaves the board without the ability to respond to such circumstances, it
is the view of the authors that such an agreement would be viewed by
the Delaware courts as an abdication by the board of its fiduciary duties.
Finally, if a Delaware court examined the lock-out provision under
the enhanced judicial scrutiny called for by Unocal, the authors believe
that a Delaware court would conclude that the Conrail board's response
was preclusive in its effect.'6 By definition, a lock-out provision,
which prevents a target company from approving or recommending any
other transaction (irrespective of its merits) or from withdrawing from a
proposed merger (irrespective of subsequent events) for an unreasonably
lengthy period of time is preclusive. In this case, the Conrail board went
even further, however, because it twice responded to offers from Nor-
folk by revising the lock-out provision in order to extend its duration
(first to 270 days and ultimately to a length of approximately 850 days).
The authors are unaware of any decision that has endorsed a lock-up
period of the type, scope or magnitude of even the original 180 day
lock-out provision, let alone the ultimate lock-out provision of over two
years. Indeed, under Delaware law, such a provision would appear to be
an impermissible delegation (or in Norfolk's view, an abdication) of the
board's fiduciary duty. As a result, the authors believe that a Delaware
court would conclude that the lock-out is unreasonable, preclusive and,
therefore, unenforceable.
163. See City Capital Assoc., L.P. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (where
facts suggested that shareholders might prefer cash payment rather than package of cash and stock
worth slightly more at some future time).
164. See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (holding
that court may not substitute its judgment for board's judgment unless board's defensive response
was preclusive or coercive or outside "range of reasonableness").
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B. Analyzing the Conrail/CSX Lock-ups Under the Entire
Fairness Standard
A Delaware court would examine the Conrail board's actions under
the entire fairness standard set forth in Weinberger 65 only if Norfolk,
qua stockholder of Conrail, succeeded in rebutting the business judg-
ment rule presumption that, in making a business decision, the Conrail
directors were disinterested and that they acted in an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that their approval of the lock-up
provisions was in Conrail's best interest or if Norfolk demonstrated that
a majority of the Conrail board had a personal, business or financial
interest in the proposed Conrail/CSX merger. 166
In this case, however, it appears unlikely that Norfolk would be
able to rebut the business judgment rule or demonstrate that a majority
of the Conrail board had a personal, business or financial interest in the
Conrail/CSX merger. While Mr. LeVan, as President, Chief Executive
Officer and Chairman of the Board, clearly had a personal and financial
interest in the proposed merger, Norfolk did not allege that Conrail's
remaining board members had an interest in the outcome of the pro-
posed merger.167 Furthermore, the pleadings may not be fairly charac-
terized as having demonstrated, and the decisions of the district court did
not address, whether the Conrail board acted in good faith or in an
informed manner. For these reasons, the authors believe that a Delaware
court would not conclude that the Conrail directors have the burden of
establishing the entire fairness of the lock-up provisions.
C. Analyzing the Conrail/CSX Lock-ups Under the Revlon Standard
Finally, a Delaware court would consider whether the Conrail
board had a duty under Revlon to act reasonably to seek the transaction
offering the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. Since a
board of directors will have Revlon duties only if the company is under-
taking a transaction that will result in a sale or change in control of the
corporate entity, 16 1 the threshold question for a Delaware court when
reviewing this transaction is whether the proposed Conrail/CSX merger
would constitute a sale or change of control.
165. Weinberger v. VOP, Inc.,457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
166. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d .1156 (Del. 1995); Unitrin, 651 A.2d at
1377 n.18; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
167. To the contrary, plaintiffs asserted (without contradiction by Conrail) that no board
member, other than Mr. LeVan, is a current or former employee or member of the management of
Conrail. See Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint
Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) For Failure to State A Claim For Which Relief May Be Granted.
168. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994).
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In general, the Delaware courts have concluded that a stock for
stock merger will not trigger Revlon duties, provided that the control of
the acquired corporation remains in a "large, fluid, changeable and
changing market" and is not passed to anyone by virtue of the transac-
tion.' 69 On the other hand, the Delaware courts have held that Revlon
duties will be implicated where the transaction in question shifts control
of the corporation from its public stockholders to a controlling stock-
holder. 170 In this case, of course, since the proposed CSX/Conrail
merger transaction includes both a stock for stock merger and a two
stage cash tender offer, it is difficult to predict whether a Delaware court
would conclude that Conrail's actions triggered Revlon duties.
On the one hand, a Delaware court might conclude that, despite
CSX's accumulation of shares of Conrail, the proposed CSX/Conrail
merger does not trigger Revlon because control of Conrail (and its suc-
cessor entity) will be held by a fluid aggregation of public stockholders.
While this position finds some support in Delaware law,171 it ignores the
fact that CSX would be a controlling stockholder of Conrail immedi-
ately prior to the consummation of the proposed back-end merger.' 72
On the other hand, a Delaware court might conclude that since control of
Conrail will pass to CSX, albeit temporarily, the duties imposed by Rev-
lon will be implicated.
While the authors are unaware of any decision of a Delaware court
that has considered whether Revlon duties would be triggered under the
circumstances described above, the authors believe that it is likely that a
Delaware court would conclude that Revlon duties would be implicated
in this case. First, notwithstanding the fact that the Conrail stockholders
will remain stockholders in a widely-held public company following the
consummation of the proposed CSX/Conrail merger, it is nevertheless
the case that it was the Conrail board's approval of the first two steps of
the transaction-the two step tender offer and the granting of the stock
option-that resulted in a change in control. Therefore, the authors
169. See Time, 1989 WL 79880, at *23.
170. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 48.
171. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., C.A. Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935, 1989
WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989).
172. In its disclosure materials filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Conrail
tacitly acknowledged that CSX would become a majority stockholder in Conrail if CSX
consummated both cash tender offers and exercised its stock option. According to Conrail:
CSX has an option (the "Option") ... to purchase 15,955,477 shares of Common
Stock, exerciseable under certain circumstances, including its purchase of Shares
under the Tender Offer. If CSX acquires 40% of the Shares and the Option is
exercised, the approval of the Merger by the Conrail shareholders would be certain.
See Proxy Statement of Conrail Inc. filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on October 26, 1996.
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believe that it is likely that a Delaware court would evaluate the Conrail
board's decisions in connection with its recommendation and approval
of these transactions under Revlon.
Second, since the Conrail stockholders are expected to receive cash
for more than 40% of their shares (if the proposed CSX/Conrail merger
is consummated), the authors believe that it is likely that a Delaware
court would conclude that the Conrail board's decision to enter into the
proposed CSX/Conrail merger would be subject to review under Revlon.
There would appear to be scant justification for reviewing a merger
under Revlon if the target company's stockholders will receive merger
consideration which consists primarily of stock of the surviving widely-
held public company, but includes a modest amount of cash. However,
if a company's stockholders were to receive merger consideration which
consists primarily of cash and a negligible amount of stock in the surviv-
ing widely-held public company, the authors believe that a Delaware
court would review the board's decision to enter into the merger under
Revlon, notwithstanding the fact that the stockholders retained a modest
equity position in the surviving company. However, where approxi-
mately sixty percent of the consideration to be received by the target
stockholders will consist of cash (as is the case with the Conrail stock-
holders), the authors believe that a Delaware court is likely to conclude
that the board's decision to enter into such a merger transaction would
be subject to review under Revlon.
If the Conrail board's decisions concerning the merger were subject
to enhanced judicial scrutiny under Revlon, then a concern for fairness
would preclude the Conrail board from using the lock-ups at issue to
favor CSX over Norfolk. 73 In this case, however, it appears that Con-
rail utilized the lock-ups for precisely the opposite purpose-to fore-
close further bidding. Thus, under the terms of the lock-up provision,
the Conrail board was not permitted to consider or accept an offer of
Norfolk, irrespective of the value of the offer, until December 31, 1998.
Furthermore, the Conrail board was not permitted to amend its poison
pill in order to allow Norfolk to acquire more than ten percent of the
shares of Conrail (without triggering the poison pill) unless CSX agreed
to such an amendment. Finally, both the termination fee and the stock
option had the effect of significantly raising Norfolk's acquisition costs.
The lock-ups also had the effect of adversely affecting the value
ultimately to be provided to the Conrail stockholders. 7 4 While Nor-
folk's offers did prompt CSX to increase its offering price, the lock-ups
nevertheless prevented Conrail's stockholders from accepting Norfolk's
173. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182-85 (Del.
174. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 49.
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even higher offers. In fact, since the Conrail board contracted away its
authority to accept a higher offer and its ability to amend its poison pill
without the consent of third parties, the lock-ups had the further effect of
preventing the Conrail board from being able to even consider such
higher offers without the consent of CSX.
In light of the foregoing, the authors believe that it is likely that a
Delaware court would conclude that each of the lock-ups utilized by
Conrail and CSX-the termination fee, the stock option, the lock-out
provision and the amendments to the poison pill-was invalid and unen-
forceable.' 75 However, even if a Delaware court were not inclined to
find any one lock-up provision, standing alone, to be unenforceable, the
authors nevertheless believe that it is likely that the court still would
conclude that the lock-ups are unenforceable because, in the aggregate,
they have the effect of impeding the realization of the best value reason-
ably available to the Conrail stockholders. 76
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the authors believe that a Delaware court, if presented
with the same facts considered by the district court, would reach a very
different legal result. Specifically, the authors believe that a Delaware
court, unlike the district court, would conclude that the lock-ups dis-
cussed above are unenforceable under Unocal because they are unrea-
sonable and disproportionate responses to the threat posed by Norfolk,
and further that, because such lock-ups have the effect of impeding the
realization of the best value reasonably available to the Conrail stock-
holders, they are invalid and unenforceable under the standards set forth
in Revlon.
Ultimately, the authors' prediction of a different legal result is not
surprising when one considers the public policies that appear to be
reflected in the Pennsylvania and Delaware business corporation stat-
utes. In Pennsylvania, the legislature has decided that corporate boards
should consider whether a merger is in the best interest of the corpora-
tion and all of its constituencies (among which the stockholders are only
one) and the board's decision with respect to such merger should remain
relatively unfettered. On the other hand, in Delaware, the General
Assembly has concluded that corporate boards should consider only
whether a merger is in the best interests of the corporation and the stock-
holders and the Delaware Court of Chancery (and Supreme Court) have
175. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; QVC, 637 A.2d at 50-51; Mills Acquisition Corp. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286, 1288 (Del. 1988); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders
Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, at *6.
176. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 50.
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the ultimate authority to determine whether the directors have been
unflinchingly fair if they were on both sides of a transaction, whether
they have responded reasonably and proportionately when their corpora-
tion is subjected to a hostile threat to corporate policy and effectiveness
and whether they have obtained the highest value reasonably available to
shareholders when selling or effecting a change in the control of the
company.
VI. EPILOGUE
The authors prepared this Article in connection with the sympo-
sium on corporate law held by the University of Miami Law School in
February of this year. As a result, this Article (and the authors' survey
of Delaware cases) was largely completed prior to the conclusion of the
Conrail/CSX/Norfolk matter. As a result, the Article does not reflect all
of the final factual or legal developments in the case. However, in the
following discussion, the authors have summarized the most significant
and material developments in the battle for control of Conrail since that
time.
On January 17, 1997, Conrail shareholders, who by this time con-
sisted largely of institutional shareholders and professional investors,
voted overwhelmingly against the proposal to amend the Articles of
Incorporation of Conrail to "opt out" of the control transaction provi-
sions of Subchapter 25E of the PBCL even though CSX owned 19.9%
of the Conrail stock and a significant number of shares were held by
Conrail employee benefit plans. Norfolk has stated that of the Conrail
shares that were voted by shareholders, other than by CSX, over 90%
opposed the opt out. At about this time, the Chair of the STB was
quoted as expressing concerns about freight competition in the northeast
and suggesting strongly to the parties that they resolve their differences
by negotiation. At that point, CSX owned 19.9% of the Conrail stock
and Norfolk had acquired 9.9% of the Conrail stock, each having made
substantial investments in Conrail with no certainty that it would ulti-
mately prevail in the contest.
In late February, Mr. Snow, CEO of CSX, reportedly urged Mr.
LeVan, CEO of Conrail, that there be a tripartite negotiated resolution of
the matter. Shortly thereafter, the Conrail board announced that it had
authorized negotiations to this effect and in early March CSX and Con-
rail announced an agreement pursuant to which all of the Conrail stock
would be purchased for cash at $115 per share and that CSX and Nor-
folk would have the right to negotiate a "carve up" of the Conrail rail-
road system. In early April, CSX and Norfolk announced that they had
agreed on an allocation of the Conrail assets to be acquired by each
19971
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party and a proportional allocation of the cash purchase price for the
Contrail stock.
Some general observations are in order. In its first major test, the
Pennsylvania anti-takeover statute was effectively validated from a judi-
cial standpoint by the district court. However, in the end, the will of the
stockholders (at least as they were constituted on January 17, 1997 and
thereafter) prevailed. In the words of one observer, "ultimately, money
talks." ' 77 As a result of Norfolk's intervention, approximately $1.5 bil-
lion of additional cash (beyond the original CSX Proposal) will have
been distributed collectively to the stockholders of Conrail. One can
properly conclude that market forces prevailed, despite the district
court's validation of the Pennsylvania statute. On the other hand, in
what may be viewed as ironic, the Pennsylvania statute, which was
clearly designed to provide a board of directors with an expanded arse-
nal of weapons to resist a hostile takeover by, among other things, per-
mitting consideration of other, non-shareholder constituencies, may have
itself contributed to the eventual outcome (which is required by the Del-
aware courts in a change of control scenario) of obtaining the best value
reasonably available to the shareholders.' 8
177. Andrew Cassel, Antitakeover Law Enriched Conrail Shareholders the Pa. Measure
Didn't Shield Jobs and Towns. The Irony, Some Say, is That it Boosted the Stock 65%,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 1997, at Cl.
178. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
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